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                        Expectation of Power, Protective Umbrella, Or Both:

                        Investigating the Heterogeneous Effect of Power on Provincial Investment in China




                        主讲人:Victor C. Shih

                        组织人:张晓波 李力行 席天扬 邢剑炜 刘怡 张鹏飞 郝煜 刘冲



                        题目:Expectation of Power, Protective Umbrella, Or Both: Investigating the Heterogeneous Effect of Power on Provincial Investment in China


                        The literature suggests that leaders reallocate resources to loyal supporters, or at least competent ones that can help them stay in power. However, existing empirical work fails to distinguish between economic actors anticipating the rise of a leader and thus allocating resources to best take advantage of the new political reality and resource reallocation conducted by the dictator himself. Much of what we may observe as the dictator’s action may well be the result of rational expectation by investors. Existing works have not been able to distinguish between these two mechanisms. We take advantage of the time disparity between a clear sign of the president obtaining the nomination to become the next leader of China and his assumption to power as the secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party to investigate this issue. Prior to his formal assumption to the head of the party, the president did not have formal authorities to reallocate resources to localities which he may favor.  Reallocation of resources prior to his formal appointment, especially in the highly competitive real estate market, likely was driven by the anticipation of firms and local officials to his assumption to power. In contrast, reallocation of investment after his assumption to power, especially state-driven investment, may be driven by his or his close associates’ reallocation of resources to their close associates. We investigate the heterogeneous impact of expectation and factional advantages on provincial patterns of real estate and infrastructure investment.



                        史宗瀚(Victor C. Shih)是加州大学圣迭戈分校国际政策与策略学院的副教授,他发表了诸多有关中国银行政策,政府财政政策和央行汇率政策的学术论文,是第一个识别和分析大规模地方政府债务风险的学者,也是Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation一书的作者。Victor Shih曾在American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Politics等政治学领域顶级刊物发表多篇论文。



                        • 北京大学经济学院

                        • 北大经院人

                        • 经院校友办